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Purpose — The purpose of this article is to provide a viewpoint about the role of cost 
transparency in consumer markets and whether or not consumers should request cost 
transparency from sellers, in light of the article by Simintiras et al. 2015.  
Design/methodology/approach — Research in the area of cost transparency, pricing and 
related theoretical domains, is synthesised to understand the potential role for buyers and 
sellers in consumer markets.   
Findings — Although there are an increasing number of examples of greater operational 
transparency in supply chains, cost transparency in consumer markets is not widespread. 
Increased cost transparency represents an important product attribute for consumers, 
enhancing fairness perceptions and affective evaluations. For sellers it is a potentially 
powerful complement to price moves, and, through enhancing trust among consumers, can 
positively influence brand value(s).   
Research limitations/implications — Operational and cost transparency holds much 
promise as an emerging area in marketing but research into cost transparency in consumer 
markets is in its early stages and the limited number of field examples reduces the scope for 
empirical work.  However using carefully controlled lab experiments much can be done to 
understand the generalisability and boundary conditions to its effect.   
Originality/value — This article takes a balanced view about value to consumers and the 
implementation of cost transparency in consumer markets, highlighting key mechanisms 
through which greater transparency may influence consumer product evaluations, and 
concluding with some caveats in relation its practice.  
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“Should Consumers Request Cost Transparency?” Cost 
Transparency in Consumer Markets 
Introduction 
Under competitive conditions it is expected that prices charged by sellers will reflect their 
costs. To this end governments have either tried to liberalise markets through deregulation or 
have sought to introduce price controls where price increases require justification by cost 
changes (Rockoff, 2004). With globalisation and the digital economy, the removal of 
information impediments for consumers has significantly improved markets. Consumers in 
the new millennium have better price information and improved product quality information 
in the form of attribute comparisons, product reviews and online forums, and these help them 
to make better choices. In many cases the balance of power seems to have shifted to 
consumers within the marketplace. However, brands still proliferate and consumers still seem 
to rely on a range of heuristics to speed up decision making (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin, and 
Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, 2011).  
Cost transparency is defined as “…the sharing of information related to cost between 
suppliers and buyers” (Simintiras et al. 2015), or more specifically as “…the disclosure of the 
variable costs associated with each component of producing a good” (Mohan et al., 2014, p. 
2). Increased cost transparency ought to allow customers to compare costs, as well as prices, 
in order to more accurately assess a product’s value and has been identified as a way to help 
build trust and relationships (Simintiras et al. 2015). Operational and cost transparency in 
business-to-business exchanges is a feature of many intermediate markets where 
collaboration between members of a supply chain is required to research and develop new 
products and processes (Lamming et al., 2002; Sinha, 2000). But has it a place in business-to-
consumer markets? In many ways cost transparency is already here. For example, fairtrade 
products are sold on the basis that they cost more to supply but that the added cost is socially 
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desirable and a component of value (Reinecke, 2010). Two questions arise: 1. Should 
consumers request cost transparency from sellers? 2. Should sellers voluntarily supply cost 
information because it provides them with an advantage? 
This commentary argues that the consumer has the right to request whatever information 
they require to make judgments about the value of the products they purchase and they can 
request this information by favouring those sellers who are most transparent. However, 
information itself comes at a cost to suppliers in the form of the loss of confidential and 
proprietary knowledge. There are also costs for consumers. For example, information 
accuracy is a perennial problem in the interpretation of costs and even within the accounting 
profession there is concern about the accuracy of cost information (Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Otley, 2001). In addition there is an increasing problem of cognitive load as consumers 
typically struggle to accurately process an ever increasing array of shopping information 
(e.g., see Fasolo et al., 2007; Lowe et al., 2015; van Ittersum et al., 2010). Even though such 
information may be conveyed on the basis of a simple unit cost figure, consumers still need 
to trade this off against an understanding of the price of the product and the value of the 
attributes to them, and whether the offer is fair and acceptable. Thus, consumers may request 
greater cost transparency but this greater transparency may come at a cost.  
 
Consumers and cost transparency  
Cost transparency is not a common feature of markets but has most commonly been seen 
within utilities under regulatory pressure. Stigler (1971) argues that whilst regulatory 
intervention might be initiated because of a dominant position in markets, much regulation is 
a negotiation process in which consumers and producer special interest groups argue their 
case in various ways. Because producers are better organised than consumers, their voice is 
often heard most. Part of the persuasive process is demonstrating that prices are not overly in 
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excess of costs in order to understate economic rents and by representing profit as an average 
rate of return consistent with the operating costs and capital and risk requirements of a 
business (Sanderson and Winter, 2002). Rail, water, power and telecommunications 
companies for instance may represent their costs, profits and investment intentions to the 
public in ways that emphasise their average profitability and forward investment plans.  
However, the provision of cost information has not typically been an attribute that 
marketers provide to consumers. This could be for a variety of reasons, including reluctance 
to publicise profit margins and an inability to provide such information in a practical and 
effective way. Cost transparency may occur on a continuum from explicit unit cost 
information at each stage of the supply chain to divulging unit variable costs for producing a 
good (Mohan et al., 2014), to signals from producers which lead to a perception of lower 
costs of production (e.g., retailers such as Aldi and Lidl may be perceived as better value 
because the company has not invested in costly and less important value added features). 
Alternatively consumers may be told costs are higher but not by how much (e.g., fairtrade 
products). So it appears that the provision of implicit or more explicit cost information does 
matter to consumers. A recent survey, for example, shows that 85% of consumers would be 
prepared to pay more for their milk if it meant helping the farmers who supplied it (Case, 
2014). However, provision of explicit unit-cost information is not widespread.  
Whilst consumers or regulators might request more cost transparency, another interesting 
question is ‘when is it in a seller’s interest to voluntarily disclose and publicise cost 
information?’ Companies may be motivated to become more transparent about costs with 
consumers for a variety of reasons. These may include:  
• Enhancing the value proposition: For example, a seller aiming to define value within 
the market (e.g., “hard” grocery discounters) as a low price-cost difference to enhance 
perceptions of fairness (Kumar, 2006).    
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• Justifying a price increase: For example, a seller aiming to counteract the adverse 
effects on customer satisfaction of a price increase (e.g., an energy company) by 
linking it to supply costs (Campbell, 1999) 
• Justifying the selling price: For example, a seller aiming to 1) to justify a higher price 
than competitors when quality is discernible (e.g., Marks & Spencer’ “quality worth 
every penny” campaign), or 2) to deflect issues about dominance in the supply chain 
(e.g., British retailer, Sainsbury’s, advertises the prices retailers pay for milk; White, 
2015).  
• Regulatory requirements: For example, to deflect regulatory interest that could lead to 
costly investigations.  
Using a series of lab and field experiments, recent research (Mohan et al., 2014) suggests 
that explicit provision of unit cost information may lead to an increase in sales of up to 44% 
for some classes of product. Therefore, firms may have a clear incentive, in some situations, 
to provide more explicit cost information to their consumer base. The implications of further 
cost transparency are discussed below, through exploring the mechanism of this effect.  
 
Cost transparency and consumer fairness perceptions 
One explanation for the mechanism through which cost transparency affects decision making 
is that consumers perceive cost transparency as a form of intimate disclosure (Mohan et al., 
2014) and that such disclosure has affective consequences for the firm and its products (e.g., 
likability and attractiveness). However, Mohan et al. (2014) point out that the benefits 
accruing to firms are likely to be lower (through lower willingness to buy and lower brand 
attraction) if the price to cost ratio is higher and if mark-ups are made more prominent to 
consumers. Therefore, firms need to be careful about how and what information is 
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communicated to consumers.  For example, cost transparency might not be appropriate for 
luxury products where the high price is less related to cost and more to exclusivity.   
Consumer fairness perceptions are likely to play a role here too (Lowe, Lowe and Lynch, 
2013) and existing frameworks incorporating fairness perceptions might provide some insight 
in assessing consumer reactions to cost transparency (Xia, Monroe and Cox, 2004). A 
consumer’s perception of costs plays an important role in the determination of perceived 
fairness and subsequent behaviour (Bearden, Carlson, and Hardesty, 2003; Campbell, 1999; 
Taylor, 1985) through the principle of Dual Entitlement (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 
1986) and transparency can lead to reciprocated behaviour (Lowe, Lynch and Lowe, 2015). 
Consumers typically have inaccurate perceptions about a firm’s costs and cueing consumers 
to develop a more accurate awareness of a firm’s costs increases fairness perceptions. 
However, cost cues should be based around making the “right” types of costs more salient 
(e.g., costs which contribute to product quality) rather than other costs (e.g., promotional 
costs), which do not appear to link to fairness perceptions (Bolton, Warlop and Alba, 2003). 
Cost transparency is also likely to be more effective in situations when direct and alignable 
costs (i.e., labour and material costs) have been made more salient to consumers rather than 
nonalignable costs (Bolton and Alba, 2006). Therefore, the effectiveness of cost transparency 
is likely to be moderated by numerous different conditions, but primarily consumers will be 
concerned about the proportion attributed to different types of costs, and changes in particular 
costs; thus, all costs are not equal in the eyes of consumers. 
 
Caveats to consumer cost transparency 
Further to the moderating conditions noted above, although there is strong evidence that cost 
transparency has the potential to influence consumer evaluations, a number of caveats should 
be noted. Firstly, it is clear that the nature of the cost information provided to consumers has 
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a strong bearing upon how they interpret that information within a fairness framework. 
However, operationally, another issue arises based upon the information that is provided to 
consumers. Accounting standards and practices vary (Otley, 2001) and in a competitive 
marketplace the nature of the cost information may need to adhere to some form of industry 
standard in order to ensure consistency of the information provided to consumers. Otherwise 
this information is likely to vary dramatically and be presented in a manner that is aligned 
with a marketing message rather than a true reflection of cost. If the nature of the information 
provided to consumers can vary too widely as a consequence of different accounting 
practices then consumers will be vulnerable to confusion and deception. Examples of this 
potential for confusion may be found in relation to different vendors who provide an 
apparently simple piece of information to buyers (in this case price) in a number of different 
formats (e.g., from £99, with or without taxes, further costs for credit card payments etc.). 
Secondly, consumers are typically concerned with evaluating a product’s benefits and 
comparing these to the product’s cost to them as consumers. Adding another dimension, such 
as a product’s unit cost of production and distribution, may lead to a further cognitive burden 
for consumers. Though cost transparency led to a number of positive effects for the seller of 
the products in the field experiment by Mohan et al. (2014) it did not take account of the 
increased complexity this would lead to in the market place if other firms started to do the 
same. Consequently, many consumers may find the enhanced cost information as an 
unwelcome distraction and burden and sellers might find its effects nullified by competitors. 
Third, if cost transparency becomes prevalent in consumer markets and firms’ prices are 
primarily based on costs, this might inhibit costly long term innovation in industries like 
pharmaceuticals where there are high and difficult to measure R&D costs (DiMasi et al., 
1991).  In innovative product categories a common decision often revolves around whether or 
not to use an initial high price to skim the market or an initial low price to penetrate the 
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market. Skimming strategies would be likely to highlight a large margin initially, which 
could be interpreted as being less fair (Lowe and Alpert, 2010). Consequently, firms 
producing innovative products with high margins would be more reluctant to publicly reveal 
their costs and cost transparency is less likely to be appropriate in the early stages of a high 
margin product’s introduction.  
 
Conclusion 
Perceived fairness is important to consumers and is a strong influence on consumer 
behaviour. Consumers can, and should, request such information from firms, and rather than 
closely guarding that information firms can provide it to enhance consumer perceptions of 
fairness and trust. Consequently, some firms may wish to pursue such a strategy to 
differentiate their offering in a way that reflects their brand value(s). To answer the question 
posed, cost transparency is not “necessary” and there are many situations where it might not 
influence consumer choice but it is an attribute of the product that consumers may request 
and is a way for competitors to communicate their value proposition more clearly. As noted 
by one veteran in the grocery industry “The consumer has the power of choice ... The price is 
greater openness and transparency. The reward: a loyal and trusting customer.” (Esom, 2008). 
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